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INDEMNIFYING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AGAINST
JUDGMENTS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
THE NEW MEXICO TORT CLAIMS ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Matthew Holt*

I.

PROLOGUE

Veteran police officer Michael Garcia undertook to protect and serve.1
Instead, he took advantage of his position as a police officer, and violated a young
woman. D.G. was a 17-year- old high school student, going on a ride-along program
with a police detective. Garcia and D.G. had been at the scene of a crime together,
after which he said he was taking her back to the police station. Instead, he took her
to a deserted area, and coerced her to perform a sexual act on him, and then digitally
penetrated her.
D.G. filed suit against Garcia, who then demanded that the governmental
entity that employed him provide him with a defense and indemnify him.2 While
D.G.’s claim for compensatory damages was significant, a huge portion of the claim
concerned itself with the potential award of punitive damages. The New Mexico Tort
Claims Act requires governmental entities to defend and indemnify an employee for
claims arising out of acts or omissions occasioned in the “scope of his duty,”
including awards of punitive damages.3 Fearful of a significant award of punitive
damages, the governmental entity spent $3,000,000 of taxpayers’ money to settle the
claim against Garcia.4

* Assistant Professor at New Mexico State University, College of Business.
1. According to the Los Angeles Police Department’s website, in 1955, Beat Magazine held a
contest to find a motto for the Los Angeles Police Department. Officer Joseph S. Dorobek suggested “to
protect and serve” as the winning entry. The motto became the unofficial motto of the LAPD, growing in
use until 1963, when the Los Angeles City Council passed an ordinance adopting it as the LAPD’s official
motto, and it was placed alongside the City Seal on the Department’s patrol cars. The Origins of the LAPD
Motto, LAPD, http://www.lapdonline.org/history_of_the_lapd/content_basic_view/1128 (last visited
Mar. 7, 2017) (reprinting the story from Beat Magazine’s December 1963 issue). The motto is firmly
embedded in New Mexico police culture to the point that, without reference to authority, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals has noted that police officers have a duty to protect and serve, even when they are not
on duty. See Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep’t, 2014-NMCA-019, ¶ 21, 317 P.3d 866.
2. See Answer for Petitioner, ¶ 5, Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43 (No.
D-307-CV-971754).
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(B)–(C) (2001).
4. Yanan Wang, Behind $3M Settlement, the Story of a Police Intern’s Dreams Shattered by Sexual
Assault, WASH. POST (March 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016
/03/24/behind-3m-settlement-the-story-of-a-police-interns-dreams-shattered-by-sexual-assault/.
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INTRODUCTION

The New Mexico Tort Claims Act (TCA) was adopted both to limit the
liability of the government, in order to protect the public treasury, and to provide for
reasonable compensation to people who have been injured by wrongful acts of the
government and its employees.5 However, a particular area of the TCA neither
decreases the government’s liability nor provides for the payment of compensation
to those injured by the government’s wrongful acts. In fact, in this area, the TCA
increases the government’s liability.
The TCA provides that the government is obligated both to defend and
indemnify employees who are subject to claims for compensatory and punitive
damages, provided only that the claims arise out of the employees’ conduct in the
“scope of the duties” tasked to the employees.6 More than 15 years ago, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that conduct that is purely personal, indeed conduct
that may be heinously felonious, conduct that does not in any way advance the
interests of the government, can be within a public employee’s “scope of duties” if
the authorized duties assigned to the employee put him or her in the position so that
they could commit the crime.
In such a case, the governmental entity has the duty both to defend and to
indemnify the employee. While punitive damages are not available against a
government employee for a common law tort, they are available for a constitutional
tort – and the TCA requires that the governmental entity indemnify the employee for
both compensatory and punitive damages.7
Because requiring the government to pay for punitive damages assessed
against a public employee for purely personal conduct that falls with the “scope of
duties” serves no public purpose, this Article argues that using taxpayer money to
pay such an award violates the anti-donation clause of the New Mexico Constitution.
III.
a.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE NEW MEXICO TORT CLAIMS
ACT

An Abbreviated History of Sovereign Immunity8

Sovereign immunity is the principle that the government itself cannot be
sued without its consent.9 Elements of flourished in England, thus becoming a core
principal in English common law.10

5. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2(A) (1976); Ruth L. Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and Governmental
Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M. L. Rev. 249, 261–62 (1976).
6. § 41-4-4(B)–(C).
7. Loya v. Gutierrez, 2015-NMSC-017, ¶¶ 44–47, 350 P.2d 1155.
8. The history in this section is adapted from Jaime McAlister, The New Mexico Tort Claims Act:
The King Can Do “Little” Wrong, 21 N.M. L. Rev. 441, 442–44 (1991).
9. Dougherty v. Vidal, 1933-NMSC-034, ¶ 6, 21 P.2d 90 (quoting State ex. rel. Evans v. Field,
1921-NMSC-082, ¶ 6, 201 P. 1059).
10. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (1788) (“[I]t is better that an individual should
sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience.”). The original source of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity is unclear. Some claim that it finds its roots in ancient Roman law (See Edwin M
Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, IV, 36 Yale L. J. 1, 3 (1926)), while other claim that
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity came to the United States with the rest
of English common law.11 While the ancient precedents of sovereign immunity seem
to stem from the idea that the kings of years bygone were anointed by God, and
therefore it was impossible for a king to do anything wrong, later cases embraced
sovereign immunity on the grounds that the king was the highest authority in the
land, and to allow a court to exercise jurisdiction over him would usurp his
authority.12 That logic, of course, had no place in American jurisprudence, as the
Constitution put the three branches of our government on somewhat even footing.
Justice Holmes explained the American rationale for sovereign immunity: “A
sovereign is exempt . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which that right depends.”13
While sovereign immunity was the unquestioned norm for years, courts
eventually began to question the unblinking adherence to this ancient doctrine.
Beginning in the 1960s, courts across the country began to reject the notion of
sovereign immunity, finding that it had no place in modern society.14
The death knell for traditional sovereign immunity in New Mexico was
sounded in 1975, in Hicks v. State,15 when the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected
the doctrine as “archaic” and stated that there were “no conditions or circumstances
which could rationally support” the continuation of sovereign immunity.16 The court
ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity had been created by the courts, and
could therefore be abolished by the courts.17 Of course, the court could only abolish
the immunities which the Judiciary had created, and it would be less than a year
before judicial sovereign immunity would be replaced in New Mexico with a much
more limited form of statutory immunity.
b.

The Adoption of the Tort Claims Act

The decision in Hicks was issued on September 26, 1975. The New Mexico
legislature met the following January in regular session, and adopted the (TCA).18
The TCA begins with a legislative declaration that the strict application of the
notion has been debunked (G. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 La.
L. Rev. 476, 477 (1953)).
11. Early on, there seemed to be some debate as to whether American had embraced the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. See Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879), which pointed out that the
maxim that “the king could do no wrong” would not be embraced in America. But, over time, it became
clear that the doctrine of sovereign immunity had firmly taken root in the United States. See Kawananakoa
v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
12. Verne Lawyer, Birth and Death of Government of Immunity, 15 CLEV. MARSHALL L. REV. 529
(1966).
13. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
14. See Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, 381 P.2d 107, 113 (Ariz. 1963); Muskopf v. Corning Hosp.
Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 463 (Cal. 1961); Evans v. Board of Cty. Comm’r, 482 P.2d 968, 972 (Colo. 1971);
Perkins v. State, 251 N.E.2d 30, 35 (Ind. 1969); Carroll v. Kittle, 457 P.2d 21, 29 (Kan. 1969); Haney v.
City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Ky. 1964); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 118
N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962); Holytz v. Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Wis. 1962).
15. Hicks v. State, 1975-NMSC-056, ¶ 13, 544 P.2d 1153.
16. Id. ¶ 8.
17. Id. ¶ 9.
18. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-1 to 30 (1975, as amended through 2015).
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doctrine of sovereign immunity can lead to unfair and inequitable results, but also
recognizes that government should not have a duty to do everything that can be done
to promote the public good.19 The TCA states that governmental entities and public
employees shall only be liable within the limitations set forth in the TCA.20
The TCA provides that governmental entities and public employees shall
be immune from tort claims except as provided in the Act, which waives immunity
for a wide variety of torts.21 It creates procedural mechanisms that require claimants
to give notice of potential claims against governmental entities,22 provides for a
shorter statute of limitations,23 and sets a limit on the amount of damages that can be
recovered.24
c.

A Review of the Relevant Portions of the Tort Claims Act

The TCA, of course, provides limited immunities only for tort claims
brought in New Mexico. It does not immunize governmental entities or public
employees for wrongs that are actionable under the laws of another jurisdiction.25
Under the TCA, a governmental entity must defend and indemnify a public
employee against any claim alleging any tort or violation of the right, privileges or
immunities secured by the constitution and laws of the United States or of New
Mexico if the wrongful act was alleged to have been committed by the public
employee “while acting within the scope of his duty.”26 Importantly, the TCA
requires the governmental entity to “pay any award for punitive or exemplary
damages awarded against a public employee . . . if the public employee was acting
within the scope of his duty.”27 Under this provision, the State’s duty to defend and
indemnify its employees, and its duty to pay for punitive or exemplary damages, are
only triggered if the public employee’s acts occurred “within the scope of his duty.”

19. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-2 (1976).
20. Id.
21. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(A) (2001).
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16 (1977).
23. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15 (1977).
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19 (2007).
25. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 490 (2003). A foreign jurisdiction, called
upon to adjudicate a tort claim against the State of New Mexico, one of its political subdivisions, or one
of its public employees, is not compelled to honor the immunities and protections created by the Tort
Claims Act, but can extend those protections under the principle of comity, as long as extending those
protections would not violate the foreign jurisdiction’s legitimate public policies. See id. at 497, 499; cf.
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426–27 (1979). In the same vein, New Mexico courts will apply the
immunity provisions of a foreign state’s law where appropriate. See Sam v. Estate of Sam, 2006-NMSC022, ¶ 1, 134 P.3d 761.
26. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(D) (2001).
27. Id. § 41-4-4(C). The Tort Claims Act does not allow for an award of punitive damages against
either the government or against a public employee, but the prohibition only applies to conventional tort
claims. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(D) (2007). Where a claim is brought against either the
government or against one of its employees under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, the statutory
proscription against punitive damages has no application. § 41-4-4(C).
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IV.
THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM:
RISK MANAGEMENT DIVISION V. MCBRAYER28
Jennifer McBrayer, a student at New Mexico State University, missed
several assignments in her English class.29 She wrote a note to her instructor, asking
that she be allowed to make up the assignments.30 Her instructor told McBrayer that
she could go with him to his off-campus apartment and pick up her assignments and
she agreed.31
McBrayer accompanied the instructor to his apartment and waited in the
front doorway while he went to look for them inside.32 He returned with the papers
– and with a stun gun.33 After a brief struggle, he forced McBrayer into his apartment,
where he tortured and raped her.34 She was finally able to escape, and her instructor
was later arrested, charged, and tried on various felony charges.35 He was ultimately
convicted of kidnapping, criminal sexual penetration, attempted murder and criminal
sexual contact, and was sentenced to fifty nine and one-half years in prison.36
McBrayer then sued her instructor, alleging that he committed the heinous
attack on her “under color of state law.”37 Her instructor—employed by a public
university—claimed that the State had a duty to defend and to indemnify him.38 The
State Risk Management Division filed a petition for declaratory judgment, asking
that the court determine “whether it had to defend or pay damages in McBrayer’s
lawsuit.”39 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Risk Management,
and McBrayer appealed.40
The Court of Appeals noted that Risk Management had a duty to defend the
instructor, and to pay any judgment or settlement against him, if he committed the
acts “while acting within the scope of his duties.”41 The court referred to this “as a
kind of statutory insurance.”42 The reference to statutory insurance is apt, and
intriguing, and warrants a brief detour from the discussion of McBrayer.

28. Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43.
29. Id. ¶ 3.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. ¶ 4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. ¶ 5.
38. See Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Supplemental Relief ¶ 7, Risk Mgmt. Div. v.
McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43 (No. D-307-CV-971754); see also Answer of Defendant
Eduardo Araiza to Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Supplemental Relief ¶ 5, Risk Mgmt. Div. v.
McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43 (No. D-307-CV-971754).
39. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, ¶ 5.
40. Id.
41. Id. ¶ 6.
42. Id.
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A brief detour to discuss insurance for Punitive Damages, and the New
Mexico Supreme Court’s Accompanying Misinterpretation of the
Tort Claims Act
Courts across the country are split as to whether insurance should be
allowed to pay for punitive damages. Perhaps the most frequently cited case to
support the argument that public policy prohibits insurance from paying an award of
punitive damages is Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty, where the
court reasoned thus:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he
gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment
of sanctions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that
insurance against criminal fines or penalties will be void as
violative of public policy. The same public policy should
invalidate any contract of insurance against the civil punishment
that
punitive
damages
represent.
The policy considerations in a state where, as in Florida and
Virginia, punitive damages are awarded for punishment and
deterrence, would seem to require that the damages rest ultimately
as well as nominally on the party actually responsible for the
wrong. If that person were permitted to shift the burden to an
insurance company, punitive damages would serve no useful
purpose. Such damages do not compensate the plaintiff for his
injury, since compensatory damages already have made the
plaintiff whole. And there is no point in punishing the insurance
company; it has done no wrong. In actual fact, of course, and
considering the extent to which the public is insured, the burden
would ultimately come to rest not on the insurance companies but
on the public, since the added liability to the insurance companies
would be passed along to the premium payers. Society would then
be punishing itself for the wrong committed by the insured.43
Other courts, however, allow insurance policies to cover punitive damages
for a variety of reasons. Arguments for allowing insurance policies to cover punitive
damages include: (1) allowing the insurer to pay punitive damages does not dilute
the punitive effect of the award, because the insurer can then sue the insured for
reimbursement of those damages;44 (2) other punitive measures, such as criminal
sanctions, are often available against the defendant, and these can act as a deterrent,
rather than relying on punitive damages;45 (3) the person insured against punitive
damages would still feel the sting of the award because after an insurance company
paid the award, the insured’s premiums would soar;46 (4) there is a fine line between
negligence and gross negligence, and therefore insurance coverage for gross

43.
44.
45.
46.

Northwestern Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440–41 (5th Cir. 1962).
Baker v. Armstrong, 1987-NMSC-101, ¶ 10, 744 P.2d 170.
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. 1964).
Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522, 524 (Ariz. 1972).
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negligence—but not for intentional misconduct—should be allowed; and47 (5) the
public policy reasons against insuring for punitive damages are outweighed by the
public policy in favor of enforcing insurance contracts that cover punitive damages.48
New Mexico allows insurance coverage for punitive damages.49 In Baker v.
Armstrong,50 one of the first New Mexico cases to allow insurance coverage for
punitive damages, the court, as part of its rationale, cited the Tort Claims Act as
evidence that public policy allowed an insurer to pay an award of punitive damages:
“Furthermore, under the tort claims act, a governmental entity is required to pay any
punitive damages awarded against a public employee acting within the scope of his
duty and not acting fraudulently or with actual intentional malice.”51
The Baker court, however, was mistaken in its understanding of the TCA.
The language quoted above implies that the governmental entity need not pay
punitive damages if the public employee was acting fraudulently or with malicious
intent. When the TCA was first passed, it made no mention of indemnification for
punitive damages, regardless of fraudulent or malicious intent.52 Rather, the TCA
provided that the government should generally indemnify a public employee for tort
liability arising out of conduct that was occasioned in the scope of the employee’s
duties, but expressly provided that the employee should be personally liable if the
employee acted “maliciously, fraudulently, or without just cause.”53
Two years later, the TCA was amended. Rather than providing that an
employee would be personally liable if he acted maliciously, fraudulently, or without
just cause, the amended TCA provided that the government would pay the entire
award, but could seek reimbursement for any payment from the employee if the
liability resulted from conduct that was malicious, fraudulent, or without just cause.54
The TCA was again amended in 1982, to expressly provide that the
governmental entity would pay any award of punitive damages against a public
employee, though the governmental entity could seek reimburse of such payment (as
well as the payment of defense costs and payment of compensatory damages) from
an employee who acted maliciously, fraudulently, or without just cause.55
This was the state of the law in 1987, when Baker v. Armstrong was
decided. The governmental entity’s obligation to pay punitive damages was
dependent only on a finding that the public employee had acted in the scope of his
duties. The governmental entity was not able to avoid paying such an award of
punitive damages simply because the “public employee was acting fraudulent[ly] or
with actual intentional malice.” Thus, in referencing the Tort Claims Act to
determine whether insurance coverage could apply to punitive damages, the Baker
47. See Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick v. U. S. Fire Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 783, 787 (Idaho 1973);
Continental Ins. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 151–52 (Ky. 1973).
48. See Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522, 524 (Ariz. 1972); Greenwood
Cemetery v. Travelers Indem. Co., 232 S.E.2d 910, 914 (Ga. 1976).
49. See Baker v. Armstrong, 1987-NMSC-101, ¶ 16, 744 P.2d 170.
50. 1987-NMSC-101, 744 P.2d 170.
51. Id. ¶ 8.
52. See 1976 N.M. Laws 159.
53. Id.
54. 1978 N.M. Laws 1028–29.
55. 1982 N.M. Laws 126.
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court misinterpreted the TCA as allowing the government to avoid paying punitive
damages when public employees acted fraudulently or with actual malice.
Returning to McBrayer
The issue before the New Mexico Court of Appeals in McBrayer was
whether the New Mexico State instructor was acting within the scope of his duties
when he tortured and raped McBrayer, pursuant to the TCA’s definition of “scope
of duties.” The Court of Appeals noted that the legislature chose not to use the phrase
“scope of employment,” but instead to use the phrase “scope of duty.”56 The TCA
provides a brief definition of the phrase:
Scope of duty means performing any duties that a public employee is
requested, required or authorized to perform by the governmental entity, regardless
of the time and place of performance . . . .57
The Risk Management Division argued that the University had not
“requested, required or authorized” the assault on Ms. McBrayer, and therefore the
instructor was not acting in the scope of his duty to the University.58 The Court of
Appeals, however, noted that it could not just read the definition of scope of duty
provided in the TCA, but was instead compelled to read the entire TCA together, in
order to provide context.59
As noted above, the TCA requires the government to pay any judgment
against an employee, including punitive damages, if the claim is based on conduct
of a public employee acting in the scope of his duties.60 The TCA also provides that
if the award of damages is the result of the public employee’s fraudulent or malicious
conduct resulting in bodily injury, property damage, or death, then the governmental
entity that paid the judgment may seek to recover the amount paid from the public
employee.61
Based upon this language, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the TCA
intended to require the government to pay a judgment when the public employee was
acting within the scope of his duty, even when acting either fraudulently or with
actual malice.62 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the TCA anticipates that an employee
can be acting in the scope of his duties even though he was acting fraudulently and/or
with actual malice:63
The language of these indemnification sections does not exclude
criminal conduct from an employee’s scope of duty. For example,
an employee whose intentional malice caused bodily injury may

56. Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, ¶ 8, 14 P.3d 43.
57. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-3(G) (2015).
58. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, ¶ 10.
59. Id. ¶ 11.
60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(B)-(C) (2015).
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4(E) (2015).
62. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, ¶¶ 13, 22.
63. Id. ¶ 12. The Court also noted that the TCA provides coverage for punitive or exemplary damages
in civil rights cases when the public employee acts in the scope of duty. Since punitive damages can only
be awarded when the public employee’s conduct was malicious, willful, reckless, wanton, fraudulent, or
in bad faith, it must be that the TCA was intended to provide coverage for such conduct. Id. ¶¶13–14.
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be guilty of battery . . . an employee whose intentional malice
results in property damages may be guilty of a trespass . . . and,
conceivably, an employee whose intentional malice results in a
wrongful death may be guilty of murder.
The Court of Appeals ultimately reasoned that the legislature anticipated
that a public employee might “abuse the duties actually requested, required or
authorized . . . and thereby commit malicious, even criminal acts that were
unauthorized, yet incidental to the performance of those duties.”64
The Court of Appeals then focused on the attack on McBrayer:
[The assault came about] through [the instructor’s] duty as a
university instructor to distribute homework assignments. Because
it appears that [the instructor] used this authorized duty as a
subterfuge to accomplish his assault, we find that a reasonable fact
finder could determine that his actions were within the scope of
his duties that NMSU requested, required or authorized him to
perform. After all, the TCA defines “scope of duties” as
“performing any duties [, not acts] that a public employee is
requested, required or authorized to perform.” . . . It is the duty,
not the tortious or criminal act, that triggers the state’s obligations
under [the TCA].65
The decision in McBrayer discussed Risk Management’s potential obligation to pay
any award or settlement of “damages,” without differentiating between the payment
of compensatory and punitive damages.66 But since the government has a duty to pay
awards of both compensatory and punitive damages rendered against a public
employee for conduct committed in the “scope of duty,” if Risk Management had a
duty to pay an award of compensatory damages to McBrayer, it also had a duty to
pay any award of punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings, which would allow the finder of fact to determine if the instructor was
acting within the scope of his duties.67
The New Mexico Supreme Court refused to grant a writ of certiorari in the
McBrayer case.68 Before the trial court had a chance determine if the instructor was
acting within the scope of his duties, however, the case was settled.69 The lawsuit
against the instructor, and the declaratory judgment action filed the by Risk
Management Division, were voluntarily dismissed.70

64. Id. ¶ 17.
65. Id. ¶ 20.
66. Id. passim.
67. Id. ¶ 30.
68. Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 16 P.3d 442 (Table) (2000).
69. See Email to Judge Robles dated August 16, 2001, attached to Motion to Extend Deadlines, Risk
Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43 (No. D-307-CV-971754).
70. Order of Dismissal, Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14 P.3d 43 (No. D-307CV-971754); Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, 14
P.3d 43 (No. D-307-CV-971754).
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The Court of Appeals’ decision has been cited in more than a score of cases,
in both state and federal court, and continues to be the law of the land. The net effect
of McBrayer is that an employee may commit a criminal act for his own benefit,
resulting not only in an award of compensatory damages to his victim, but an award
of punitive damages, and the taxpayers of New Mexico will have to pay that award
if the circumstances that allowed the criminal act found their origin in the employee’s
work for a governmental entity.
The Court of Appeals’ decision in McBrayer was embraced by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in Celaya v. Hall.71 Hall, a volunteer chaplain with the
Bernalillo County Sheriff’s Department, ran over Celaya’s foot in the parking lot of
Wal-Mart. Hall was at Wal-Mart on a personal errand, driving an unmarked vehicle
provided by the Sheriff’s office.72 He could not recall what he was doing immediately
before going to Wal-Mart, but testified that he customarily drove the Department’s
vehicle only in connection with his official chaplain duties.73
Plaintiff filed suit almost three years after the incident. While there is a
three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries,74 the TCA has a two-year
statute of limitations.75 Therefore, if Hall was acting “in the scope of his duties,” the
claim would be barred by the TCA’s two-year statute of limitations. The trial court
found that Hall was acting in the scope of his duties, and therefore granted summary
judgment in his favor.76 The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court.77 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari.78
In discussing whether Hall was acting in the scope of his duties, the
Supreme Court relied on, and quoted from, the decision in McBrayer. For example,
it quoted McBrayer for the proposition that, in adopting the phrase “scope of duties,”
the legislature “created and defined a unique standard to be applied to TCA claims
based upon acts of public employees.”79 The Ceyala court also drew on another
decision by the Court of Appeals, the case of Medina v. Fuller.80 The defendant in
Medina, a deputy sheriff, was driving a departmental vehicle home from work when
she stopped for a personal errand, and was involved in an accident. The deputy was
on-call, and she was authorized to drive the departmental vehicle to and from work.
81
Reasoning that the deputy’s continuous use of the vehicle was for the benefit of
the sheriff’s department, and that her use of the vehicle was “permitted, if not
required” by her employer—a governmental entity—the Court of Appeals concluded
that her use of the vehicle was “within the literal definition of [her] ‘scope of
duties.’”82
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

2004-NMSC-005, ¶ 22, 85 P.3d 239.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (2015).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15 (2015).
Celaya, 2004-NMSC-005, ¶ 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 22 (quoting Risk Mgmt. Div. v. McBrayer, 2000-NMCA-104, ¶ 8, 14 P.3d 43).
See id. ¶¶ 22, 23, 26 (discussing Medina v. Fuller, 1999-NMCA-011, 971 P.2d 851).
Medina, 1990-NMCA-11, ¶¶ 5, 7.
See id. ¶¶ 11–12.
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After discussing McBrayer and Medina, the Court in Ceyala reasoned that
an employee is within the scope of his or her duties whenever there is “a connection
between the public employee’s actions at the time of the incident and the duties the
public employee was ‘requested, required or authorized’ to perform.”83 The Court
noted that while Hall was unable to remember exactly what he was doing before the
incident, he testified that he drove the governmental vehicle only when he was
performing his duties as the department’s chaplain.84 In an affidavit submitted to the
court, Hall testified that he “would occasionally stop in a store and run a personal
errand on the way to or from a chaplain assignment,” but that he “never drove the
vehicle exclusively for [his] own personal use.”85 The Court reasoned that since Hall
“never drove his Department vehicle exclusively for personal use, and because he
was driving it at the time of the incident, then he must have been coming from a
‘chaplain assignment’ when he stopped off at Wal-Mart.”86 Thus, the court reasoned,
a jury could find that he was acting in the scope of his duties, and reversed the grant
of summary judgment.
The decisions in McBrayer, Medina and Ceyala illustrate that a government
employee can be in the “scope of his duties,” and thus can create vicarious liability
for his government employer (and by extension, for the taxpayers which fund that
governmental entity) not just when the employee is in the scope of employment,87
but even when engaging in criminal acts88 that are not for the benefit of the
government entity.
V.
a.

A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY SHOULD NOT HAVE TO PAY
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Law Governing an Award of Punitive Damages

An award of punitive damages is for the “limited purpose of punishment
and to deter others from the commission of like offenses.”89 A culpable mental state
is therefore required.90 An award of punitive damages can be made only if the

83. Ceyala, 2004-NMSC-005, ¶ 26 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41–4–3(G) (2015)).
84. Id. ¶ 27.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. The doctrine of respondeat superior imposes vicarious liability on an employer for the torts of
its employees when they are committed in the “course and scope” of employment. See Spurlock v.
Townes, 2016-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 12–13, 368 P.3d 1213. An act is in the “course and scope” of employment
if (1) the act was fairly and naturally incidental to the employer’s business and (2) it was committed by
the employee “with the view of furthering the employer’s interest.” N.M. CIV. U.J.I. 13-407. If the
employee’s conduct arises from some external, independent and personal motive, it is not in the “course
and scope” of employment. That means that – generally - an employee who intentionally injures another
person is acting outside of the scope of their employment. See Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 2004-NMSC018, ¶ 29, 91 P.3d 58.
88. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (AM. LAW. INST. 1958), outlines the criteria that
a court should consider in determining whether an act is within the scope of employment. The last criterion
asks that the court consider whether the act is “seriously criminal.”
89. N.M. CIV. U.J.I. 13-1827.
90. See Sloan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004-NMSC-004, ¶ 23, 85 P.3d 230.
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defendant acted maliciously, willfully, recklessly, wantonly, fraudulently, or in bad
faith.91
Since punitive damages are intended to punish—and not to compensate—
commentators have recognized that “[t]he concept of punitive damages lies in the
borderland that both bridges and separates criminal law and torts.”92 Punitive
damages may be appropriate in certain cases because the criminal law does not
always adequately punish the wrongdoer.93 “Therefore, punitive damages are
necessary and useful to serve the dual purposes of the criminal law: the punishment
and deterrence of unacceptable conduct.”94
Punitive damages do not compensate a victim of a crime that the public
employee may have committed. The victim is compensated by an award of
compensatory damages. The award of punitive damages is, instead, to punish and to
deter. Therefore, in determining whether the government is benefitted by paying
punitive damages, the focus therefore should not be on the victim.
b.

Requiring a Governmental Entity to Pay Punitive Damages Serves No
Purpose

Courts have clearly and unequivocally ruled that governments are not
benefitted by paying punitive damages. These cases certainly did not arise in the
context of claims for the indemnification of punitive damages, but in determining
whether the government can be—and should be—held directly liable for punitive
damages.
The seminal case on this issue is Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,95 where
the United States Supreme Court discussed the fact that, historically, courts have
always recognized that a governmental entity should not have to pay punitive
damages, reasoning that requiring a government to pay punitive damages serves no
purpose.96 The Newport court reasoned that punitive damages awards against a
government were against public policy, “because such awards would burden the very
taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised.”97
91. N.M. CIV. U.J.I. 13-1827.
92. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 2 (1982); accord, see Bradley D. Toney, The Chaotic and Uncertain Due Process Challenge to Punitive
Damages, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 635 (1994).
93. Nicholas K. Kile, Constitutional Defenses Against Punitive Damages: Down but not out, 65 IND.
L.J. 141 (1989). Although recognizing that punitive damages serve the same purpose as the criminal law,
courts have been quick to point out that punitive damages are not a criminal sanction, and therefore the
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on double jeopardy is not violated when someone is both sentenced to
prison and held liable for punitive damages in a civil lawsuit. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93,
103 (1997).
94. Kile, supra note 93, at 143.
95. 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
96. Id. at 267.
97. Id. at 263. While holding that the government could not be held directly liable for punitive
damages, the Court acknowledged that some state statutes authorized the indemnification of punitive
damages, though noting that a number of those statutes “specifically exclude indemnification for
malicious or willful misconduct of the employees.” Id. at 269, n.30. A small handful of courts have, since
that time, held that such indemnification does not conflict with the governmental body’s immunity granted
by Newport. See, e.g., Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled by Russ v.

330

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47; No. 1

The New Mexico Supreme Court has echoed this sentiment repeatedly. In
Torrance County Mental Health Program v. New Mexico Health & Environment
Department,98 the Supreme Court considered whether punitive damages could be
recovered from the State for a bad-faith breach of contract.99 The Court noted that
while the TCA precluded an award of punitive damages for tort claims, a comparable
statute concerning contract claims was silent as to punitive damages. The Court
balanced competing interests: 1) deterring the abuse of governmental power and
promoting accountability of governmental offices, and 2) protecting public revenues
and the injustice of punishing innocent taxpayers rather than the officials at fault.100
The court found that the balance was to be struck by not awarding punitive damages
against the government. The court specifically noted that such an award served only
as a windfall to the plaintiff.

c.

Punitive Damages Cannot Be Awarded Against a Governmental Entity

The New Mexico Legislature seems to agree that punitive damages should
not be paid by the taxpayers. The TCA expressly provides that punitive damages
may not be awarded against the State or against any of its political subdivisions, for
any tort for which immunity has been waived.101
In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that punitive damages
cannot be awarded against a governmental entity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.102 The
Supreme Court’s rationale for not awarding punitive damages against a government
is that punitive damages are not intended to compensate, but to punish the tortfeasor
and to deter others from similar conduct.103 Since punitive damages are—as the name

Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005); Cornwell v. City of Riverside, 896 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1984); Haile
v. Village of Sag Harbor, 639 F. Supp. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
98. 1992-NMSC-026, 830 P.2d 145.
99. Id. ¶¶ 1, 10.
100. Id. ¶¶ 27–28 (noting that “[n]either reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be
visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers” (citing Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981))).
101. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-19(D) (2007).
102. Newport, 453 U.S. at 271.
103. Certainly, one could argue that a governmental entity would be less likely to commit a violation
of someone’s rights if the entity could be exposed to punitive damages. But the issue here is not the
commission of a tort by a governmental entity, but by one of its employees. Even if the conduct could be
directly attributed to the governmental employer (but certainly not in the case of the police department
that employed Garcia), there can be no real claim that the government acted with malice. The United
States Supreme Court considered the question whether an award of punitive damages against a
government might have a deterrent effect, and concluded it was “far from clear” that it would. Instead,
the court suggested that corrective action, such as the discharge of the public officials who were involved
and the public excoriation of those who were elected, would follow. Id. at 269. As the Court noted, “The
more reasonable assumption is that responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for the public
fisc but also by concern for the Government’s integrity.” Id. at 269 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 21 (1980)). The Court also noted a more effective means of deterrence – an award of punitive damages
against the offending official. Id. at 269–70. The Court said that awarding punitive damages against the
offending official provides sufficient protection against the prospect that an official will commit recurrent
violations, and that the threat of such an award against the individual is more effective as a deterrent than
the threat of punitive damages against the governmental employer. Id. If anything, the TCA, by requiring
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implies, punitive—such an award against a government serves only to punish
taxpayers.
VI.
USING TAXPAYER MONEY TO PAY PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AWARDED AS A RESULT OF WHOLLY PERSONAL CONDUCT
VIOLATES THE ANTI-DONATION CLAUSE OF THE NEW MEXICO
CONSTITUTION
a.

The New Mexico Constitution Prohibits Expenditure of Taxpayers’
Monies for Private Purposes.

The New Mexico Constitution prohibits the use of taxpayers’ monies for
private purposes,104 except in certain, narrowly defined, circumstances which are
inapplicable here.105 The “anti-donation clause” of the New Mexico Constitution
provides:
Neither the state, nor any county, school district, or
municipality . . . shall directly or indirectly lend or pledge its credit
or make any donation to or in aid of any person, association or
public or private corporation. . . . 106
There are a number of reported cases involving the interpretation of this
constitutional provision and many opinions from the Attorney General on this
provision. The cases and Attorney General opinions are in accord that the
government may not use taxpayers’ money for anything unless the government
receives fair value in return.107
An early application of the anti-donation clause can be found in State ex.
rel. Mechem v. Hannah.108 The State had been facing a severe drought, resulting in
a very limited, and very expensive, supply of hay for cattle. The federal government
interceded, and offered a program that would help pay for hay, provided that New
Mexico would also contribute financially. The state legislature passed an
appropriations bill, authorizing a contribution to the program that would have
provided hay—or, at least, money for hay—to New Mexico ranchers. The Governor,
relying on an opinion from the Attorney General, refused to allow the money to be
provided,109 and a lawsuit ensued.

that the government pay the award of punitive damages in the first instance, removes the immediate threat
of assessing punitive damages against the governmental employee.
104. N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14.
105. Id. (explaining that public monies may be used to provide care for the sick and indigent, to provide
scholarships for veterans at post-secondary institutions, to create new job opportunities by buying land,
buildings or infrastructure to support new or expanding businesses under certain circumstances, or to pay
for land for affordable housing).
106. Id.
107. See Indemnification Under the Educational Retirement Act, N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 10-05,
2010 WL 5113294 (Dec. 2010); Public Funding in Defense of Alleged Misconduct in Public Schools,
N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 07-03, 2007 WL 2143020 (July 2007); Insurance for Criminal Defense
Expenses, N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 85-23, 1985 WL 190691 (Sept 1985).
108. 1957-NMSC-065, 314 P.2d 714.
109. Id. ¶ 1.
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The case reached the New Mexico Supreme Court, and the Court reasoned
that the program to provide hay by the federal government, aided by the State of New
Mexico, “was a wonderful thing for the livestock industry, and no doubt was the
cause of larger numbers of livestock staying on their range in New Mexico for future
production of their kind, thus benefitting the economy of the state. . . . “110
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the act authorizing such a payment violated
the anti-donation clause.111
Absent an exception that allows the government to donate money, such as
to the indigent,112 the New Mexico Constitution prohibits the government from
paying money for the benefit of others, unless it also receives a corresponding
benefit.
b.

Paying Punitive Damages for a Public Employee’s Purely Personal
Conduct Violates the Anti-Donation Clause

The requirement that the government pay punitive damages, at least when
an employee’s conduct leading to the award of punitive damages was purely
personal, violates the anti-donation clause. When the government pays punitive
damages, the government employee who committed a tortious act benefits by being
discharged from his or her obligation to pay damages. The plaintiff who was awarded
damages also benefits, because he or she receives compensation greater than the
amount necessary for any injuries. However, the government does not receive a
corresponding benefit, which is required under the anti-donation clause.
There are no reported decisions from a New Mexico court that consider this
issue.113 An analogous issue, however, was raised in the United States District Court

110. Id. ¶ 39.
111. Id. ¶ 40.
112. The anti-donation clause does not impose an absolute ban on using taxpayers’ money without
receiving a benefit in return. It contains a number of exceptions, which specifically allow the use of
government funds for specific purposes. For example, Article IX, § 14 (A), allows for government monies
to be used to help the poor and the ill: “Nothing in this section prohibits the state or any county or
municipality from making provision for the care and maintenance of sick and indigent persons.” There
are, however, no exceptions that would allow the government to use taxpayer money to pay an award of
punitive damages assessed against a public employee.
113. This is a uniquely New Mexico problem. Since many states have constitutional provisions similar
to New Mexico’s anti-donation clause, so it would seem that this issue would have arisen elsewhere. But
it has not. The reason it has not arisen elsewhere may be due to the fact that the provisions in the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act, which purport to require indemnification for punitive damages, are unique. Other
states generally require that governmental employers indemnify their employees for compensatory
damages, but not punitive damages, or provide for the indemnification of punitive damages only under
circumstances where the governmental employee was truly acting in the best interests of the government.
For example, the law in Colorado provides that a public entity shall pay for all judgments or settlements
of claims against public employees, where the claim arose out of injuries sustained from an act or omission
of the public employee during the performance of his duties and in the scope of his employment, “except
where such act or omission is willful or wanton. . . . “ COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-110 (West 2016).
The law in Idaho imposes on the public entity a duty to defend and indemnify its employees, but allows
the entity to “refuse a defense or disavow and refuse to pay any judgment for its employee if it is
determined that the act . . . included malice or criminal intent.” IDAHO CODE § 6-903(3) (2016). The law
in Kansas provides that the governmental entity may refuse to provide a defense if the “employee acted
or failed to act because of actual fraud or actual malice.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6108(c)(2) (West 2016).
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for the District of Northern Alabama. Carr v. City of Florence dealt with a resolution
adopted by the City of Florence, which agreed to pay, on behalf of its employees, all
sums which the employees became legally obligated to pay because of “negligent
and wrongful acts caused by an occurrence arising out of and in the line and scope
of their legal duties. . . . “ 114 Several Florence police officers engaged in a nighttime
chase and warrantless search.115 Twelve plaintiffs filed suit against a number of
officers and governmental entities.116 The trial court entered summary judgment on
the issue of liability against Officer Harvey, who had angrily slapped one of the
plaintiffs during an interrogation.117 The rest of the case went to trial.118
During the course of trial, the court granted a directed verdict in favor of
many of the defendants.119 With the exception of Officer Harvey, the jury found in
favor of the defendants who had not obtained a directed verdict.120 As to Officer
Harvey, the jury awarded $100 to the plaintiff he had slapped, but no punitive
damages.121
The plaintiff who was slapped filed a motion for additur, arguing that he
should have been awarded greater damages.122 He specifically complained that the
court erred in excluding from evidence the ordinance adopted by the City of
Florence, apparently believing that if the jury had been aware of the ordinance which
required the City of Florence to pay any judgment, rather than the individual officer,
it would have been more likely to award punitive damages.123
The ordinance required the City of Florence to pay any award stemming
from the “negligent and wrongful” acts of its officers.124 The trial court kept it out of
evidence for a variety of reasons, most notably for its conclusion that the ordinance
did not require the City of Florence to pay an award of punitive damages.125 The trial
court noted that the constitution of Alabama placed limits on what the government
could voluntarily agree to pay.126 Quoting a provision similar to the New Mexico
anti-donation clause, the court noted that the legislature could not “grant public
money or a thing of value in aide of, or to any individual. . . . “127 The court went on
to note that the City’s resolution had to be read to allow for payment of its employees
The law in Washington provides that the governmental employer has a duty to defend and indemnify only
while the employee was acting in good faith. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.060, 4.92.070 (West 2016).
And the law in Vermont imposes upon the government a duty to defend and indemnify except where the
judgment results from gross negligence or willful misconduct. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5606 (2016).
114. 729 F. Supp. 783, 786 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
115. Id. at 784.
116. Id. at 785.
117. Id. at 785, 786.
118. Id. at 785.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 785.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 786 (explaining that plaintiff sought to introduce the ordinance after the defense lawyer
introduced evidence showing that the police officer lacked the money to pay punitive damages).
124. Id. (quoting the Florence City Council Resolution adopted April 15, 1986).
125. Id. at 788–89.
126. Id. at 788 (quoting ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 94).
127. Id.
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liabilities only if the conduct was both negligent and wrongful, because otherwise it
would require the city to pay for liability arising solely from wrongful conduct. Any
other reading, the court reasoned, would be unconstitutional.
Citing an amendment to Alabama’s version of the anti-donation clause,
which allows the government to spend money when the expenditure is deemed “in
the proper corporate interest,” the court noted that while there might be a proper
corporate purpose in defending a public employee accused of wrongdoing, “[t]here
is a marked difference between providing the cost of defense and paying a punitive
judgment. Any casualty insurance company would readily recognize this
distinction.”128
Although the decision in Carr seems to be the only case that directly
addresses the issue, an analogous issue has been the subject of frequent litigation. A
number of cases have dealt with the question of whether a government can properly
pay for the legal expenses incurred by a public employee in defending themselves
against criminal charges.129 Courts have consistently held that if the conduct
resulting in criminal charges arose out of their public employment, the government
can reimburse the employees for their legal expenses only if they are found not
guilty, and they have acted in good faith.130 Otherwise, the courts agree, no public
purpose would be served by reimbursing them for their legal expenses, and paying
those expenses would be an unconstitutional payment.131
Wright v. The City of Danville132 is typical of this line of cases. A group of
people filed suit against the City and its commissioners, alleging a violation of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.133 A proposed settlement agreement was reached when
the commissioners agreed to a change in the form of government from a mayorcommissioners system to a mayor-aldermen system, with aldermen elected from
seven two-member districts. The agreement contained provisions, insisted on by the
existing commissioners, that the existing commissioners would be appointed as
administrators of the various departments that corresponded with their then-current
duties as commissioners. They were guaranteed new employment in these

128. Id. at 789 (emphasis in original).
129. See, e.g., Lomelo v. City of Sunrise, 423 So. 2d 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Ellison v. Reid,
397 So. 2d 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Wright v. City of Danville, 675 N.E.2d 110 (Ill. 1996); Snowden
v. Anne Arundel Cty., 456 A.2d 380 (Md. 1983); Bowens v. City of Pontiac, 419 N.W.2d 24 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Warda v. City Council of Flushing, 696 N.W. 2d 671 (Mich.
2005); Sonnenberg v. Farmington Twp., 197 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Kroschel v. City of
Afton, 512 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Beckett v. Bd. of Supervisors, 363 S.E.2d 918 (Va. 1988).
130. See, e.g., Lomelo, 423 So. 2d at 977 (holding that costs of defending public official for misconduct
charges served public purpose only because official was acquitted of charges); Reid, 397 So. 2d at 354;
Snowden, 456 A.2d at 385 (holding that indemnity ordinance served public purpose primarily because it
limited reimbursement to only those public officials who had successfully defended themselves against
criminal charges); Bowens, 419 N.W.2d at 26; Sonnenberg, 197 N.W.2d at 854; Kroschel, 512 N.W.2d at
356–57; Beckett, 363 S.E.2d at 921.
131. See, e.g., Lomelo, 423 So. 2d at 977; Reid, 397 So. 2d at 354; Snowden, 456 A.2d at 385; Bowens,
419 N.W.2d at 26; Sonnenberg, 197 N.W.2d at 854; Kroschel, 512 N.W.2d at 356; Beckett, 363 S.E.2d at
921.
132. 675 N.E.2d 110 (Ill. 1996).
133. See 42 U.S.C. §1973b (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10303 (2014)).
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administrative positions for three years, at salaries the commissioners would set
themselves.134
The State’s Attorney felt that the proposed settlement agreement was a
conflict of interest. He issued subpoenas, requiring the commissioners to appear
before a grand jury.135 A federal court issued an injunction, prohibiting the grand
jury from going forward, and approved the settlement agreement. The
commissioners then adopted a new ordinance, in keeping with the settlement
agreement.136 In addition to the agreed-upon terms, the new ordinance provided that
the City would pay for any legal fees that the commissioners incurred in the event
that criminal charges were brought against them, provided only that any
commissioner seeking indemnity had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was
unlawful and that the act or omission leading to the charges was within the scope of
the office or employment.137
After the ordinance was passed, the injunction issued by the federal court
was dissolved. The State’s Attorney convened the grand jury, and the commissioners
testified that they would receive personal benefit from the settlement agreement and
ordinance, and that they never would have agreed to the settlement without the
provisions allowing them to effectively retain their positions. The grand jury then
indicted the members of the commission, charging them with official misconduct
and conflict of interest.
The federal district court again issued an injunction, reasoning that it had
resolved the issues of the commissioner’s criminal liability when it approved the
settlement. The federal court of appeals, however, reversed, finding that the district
court had only determined that the City had the power to enter into the agreement,
and did not have the power to determine that the negotiation process was valid.
The commissioners subsequently stood trial on the criminal charges. During
the trial, they admitted that they had no right to require that they retain their jobs as
a condition of settling the voting rights litigation, and that they were not entitled to
retention. All of the commissioners were found guilty of official misconduct. The
convictions were reversed by the Illinois Court of Appeals, and then reinstated by
the Illinois Supreme Court.138
The commissioners incurred legal expenses of over $320,000. They filed
suit against the City, seeking reimbursement of their legal expenses. The trial court
summarily found that the commissioners were not entitled to reimbursement, and the
case was appealed. The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed, finding that there were
material issues of fact that should be addressed by the trial court.139 The Illinois
Supreme Court then granted the City’s petition to appeal to the state’s highest court.
The Illinois Constitution has a clause (similar to the anti-donation clause
found in New Mexico’s constitution) which provides that public funds may be
expended only for a public purpose.140 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that a state
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Wright, 675 N.E.2d at 113.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114 (quoting Danville, Ill. Ordinance no. 7237 (effective Mar. 10, 1987)).
Id. at 113–14.
Id. at 114.
ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.

336

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47; No. 1

statute provided that local governments could indemnify their employees for
compensatory damage awards and for costs in civil actions, but that they could not
indemnify against an award of punitive damages.141 It also noted that defraying the
costs of purely private litigation has “always been outside the bounds of a proper
public purpose.”142 Finally, it noted that while a legislative body has broad discretion
in determining what constitutes a public purpose, that discretion is not unlimited, and
the courts should intervene when public property is devoted to a private purpose.143
The court also reviewed cases involving the same issue: whether public
money could be used to pay for the attorneys’ fees incurred by public employees
whilst defending themselves from criminal charges. The court summarized the cases
succinctly and accurately:
[I]t is generally held . . . that a valid public purpose exists only
when the authority of the municipality is limited to the
reimbursement of legal expenses incurred in a successful
defense.144
After reviewing the case law concerning the use of public monies to pay for
attorneys’ fee incurred by public employee, the court concluded that the City would
obtain no benefit from paying for the attorneys’ fees:
Further, the purpose of indemnification, so as not to inhibit capable
individuals from seeking public office, has no relevance in the
context of the criminal conduct involved in this case. No official
of public government should be encouraged to engage in criminal
acts by the assurance that he will be able to pass defense costs on
to the taxpayers of the community he was elected to serve.145
Wright v. City of Danville is not an aberration, but instead reflects the
mainstream of reported decisions: Using taxpayers’ money to pay for attorneys’ fees
incurred by public employees who are then convicted of a crime serves no public
purpose, and therefore it is unconstitutional.
The parallel between cases involving punitive damages against a public
employee for purely personal conduct and cases involving attorneys’ fees incurred
in the unsuccessful defense against criminal charges is patent. In both cases, the
public employee is subject to liability because of personal conduct that is markedly
different from the type of act he was authorized to perform, or that was performed
purely in his own self-interest.
The courts of New Mexico have never had the occasion to address this
question. But the issue has repeatedly arisen, as is evidenced by several requests to
the New Mexico Attorney General, asking for advice on the topic. And in their
formal opinions, our Attorneys General have followed the mainstream of cases,
concluding that paying for a public employee’s legal fees associated with criminal

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 10/9-102 (2002).
Wright, 675 N.E.2d at 115 (citing City of Chicago v. Williams, 55 N.E. 123 (Ill. 1899)).
See id. at 115–16.
Id. at 116 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 117.
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charges would violate the anti-donation clause unless the employee is acquitted, and
was acting in good faith.146
1983-1986 Opinion of the Attorney General 425
In 1985, the Attorney General was asked to opine as to whether the State
could pay for attorney’s fees incurred by public employees in connection with
criminal charges brought against them.147 The Attorney General noted that there was
no statutory authority for the government to pay such fees, but noted that a number
of other states had statutes allowing for the payment of criminal defense fees, subject
to a number of conditions.148 The opinion also noted that in some jurisdictions, courts
had allowed the payment of such fees even in the absence of statutory authority,
again subject to some conditions.149 Finally, the opinion noted that some courts had
held that the government could not voluntarily pay such fees.150
The Attorney General framed the question as one involving the effect of the
anti-donation clause. The opinion discussed Montgomery v. Collins151, a decision by
the Alabama Supreme Court. The question in that case was whether the government
could pay the attorney’s fees incurred by three police officers.152 The three officers
had testified before a grand jury, resulting in an indictment.153 An order was entered
enjoining the City of Montgomery (who had employed the police officers) from
spending municipal funds in the defense of the criminal charges against the police
officer. . 154 The Alabama Supreme Court held that because of the conclusive effect
of conviction might have in subsequent civil litigation, the government had an
interest in providing the employees with a defense in the criminal case, and paying
the fees would not violate Alabama’s anti-gratuity clause.155
The Attorney General’s opinion also states that, given the absence of
statutory authority in New Mexico for the payment of such fees, it was the Attorney
General’s opinion that paying the fees would not violate the anti-donation clause if:
1.
The criminal charges arose from the discharge of an official duty in which
the government had an interest;
2.
The employee had acted in good faith when the alleged criminal conduct
occurred;
3.
The agency seeking to indemnify the employee had the express or implied
power to do so;
4.
The employee is exonerated of the criminal charges; and

146. The opinions of the Attorney General do not have the force of law in New Mexico. The opinions
are, however, entitled to “great weight.” United States v. Reese, 2014-NMSC-013, ¶ 36, 326 P.3d 454
(quoting Hanagan v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 1958-NMSC-053, ¶ 9, 325 P.2d 282).
147. See Insurance for Criminal Defense Expenses, N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 85-23, 1985 WL 190691,
at *1 (Sept. 1985).
148. See id.
149. See id. at *2.
150. See id.
151. See id. (discussing City of Montgomery v. Collins, 355 So. 2d 1111 (Ala. 1978)).
152. See City of Montgomery, 355 So. 2d at 1112–13.
153. See id. at 1112.
154. See id. at 1112–14.
155. See id. at 1114–15.
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The decision to pay the fees was be made by an impartial official or official
body which performed a thorough investigation to determine the existence
of the first four factors.156
Opinion of the Attorney General 07-03

A similar question was presented to the Attorney General in 2007.
Specifically, the Attorney General was asked to opine as to whether public funds
could be used to pay for legal fees incurred by public employees in legal actions filed
against them.157 The Attorney General referred to the 1985 Opinion Letter, and noted
that there were no significant changes in the law since that time.158 The 2007 opinion
repeated the five criteria quoted above, and noted that while the 1985 opinion dealt
with fees associated with criminal charges, similar criteria should be used in civil
proceedings.159 The Attorney General emphasized the importance that the employee
acted in good faith and was exonerated:
The requirements that the allegations arise from conduct within the
public employee’s official capacity or scope of employment and
that the employee be exonerated ensure that public funds are not
improperly used to provide a defense in personal proceedings.160
That the employee was exonerated seems to be important; it not only
appears in the list of criteria, but was specifically referred as a requirement for the
expenditure of public funds.161 For example, the Attorney General cited as support
for his position the opinion of the Attorney General of New York in a similar case,
specifically quoting that opinion’s statement that “[a] municipality’s ‘payment of
legal fees when an employee is found guilty would constitute an unconstitutional gift
of public funds because an employee acting criminally is not acting within the scope
of his public employment.’”162
Opinion of the Attorney General 10-05
Bruce Malott, the former chairman of the Education Retirement Board for
the State of New Mexico, was named as a defendant in four separate lawsuits.163 He
was the target of an investigation instituted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and he was being investigated by a federal grand jury.164 Risk
Management assigned counsel to represent him in the two lawsuits, and the
156. See Insurance for Criminal Defense Expenses, N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 85-23, 1985 WL 190691,
at *3 (Sept. 1985).
157. Public Funding in Defense of Alleged Misconduct in Public Schools, N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No.
07-03, 2007 WL 2143020, at *1 (July 2007).
158. See id. at *2.
159. See id.
160. Id. at *6.
161. See id.
162. Id. (quoting Town’s Authority to Reimburse Legal Fees, N.Y. Informal Att’y Gen. Op. No. 200316, 2003 WL 22669327, at *2 (Nov. 2003)).
163. See Indemnification Under the Education Retirement Act, N.M. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 10-05, 2010
WL 5113294, at *1 (Dec. 2010).
164. See id.
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Educational Retirement Board offered to provide him with counsel, at its expense,
to defend him in the lawsuits, but Malott chose to hire counsel of his choice.165 He
then demanded that the State reimburse him for his legal expenses.166
The Attorney General opined that while the State had a duty to provide
Malott an attorney in the two civil lawsuits, it had done so.167 It had no duty to pay
for Malott’s private counsel. Malott argued that the attorneys provided by the State
were insufficient, because they would not protect his “individual, personal
interests.”168 The Attorney General, however, noted that the State could not provide
a defense in a proceeding implicating Malott’s personal, individual interest without
violating the anti-donation clause.169
The State did not offer an attorney to represent Malott in connection with
the grand jury investigation.170 In response to Malott’s claim that he was entitled to
be indemnified for expenses associated with the criminal investigation, the Attorney
General again reviewed the 1985 opinion, reciting the five criteria noted above.171
The Attorney General focused on the fourth criterion, the requirement that the
employee be exonerated of the criminal charge before the State could reimburse the
employee for his legal expense:
As applied to the ERB, the fourth criterion — the employee’s
exoneration — is most critical. As discussed in this Office’s
previous opinions, the exoneration requirement ensures that public
funds are not improperly used to defend a public employee or
officer who is convicted of a crime. Criminal acts, by definition,
are not within the scope of an officer’s public duties or
employment. 172
In support of this position, the Attorney General cited to Wright v. City of
Danville,173 the decision by the Illinois Supreme Court discussed at the outset of this
section. And in Wright, the court noted that:
[H]olding public officials personally liable for the expenses
incurred in unsuccessfully defending charges of their criminal
misconduct in office tends to protect the public and to secure
honest and faithful service by such servants. Indeed, allowing
expenditure of public funds for such use would encourage a
disregard of duty and place a premium upon neglect or refusal of
public officials to perform the duties imposed upon them by law.174

165. See id. at *1–2. Although Malott hired his own counsel, the Risk Management Division had
assigned, or made counsel available, to Malott in at least some of the cases.
166. See id. at *2.
167. See id. at *2–3.
168. Id. at *11.
169. Id. at *11–12.
170. Id. at *3.
171. See id. at *6.
172. Id. (citation omitted).
173. See id. (citing Wright v. City of Danville, 675 N.E.2d 110, 118 (Ill. 1996)).
174. See Wright, 675 N.E.2d at 117.
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As noted by the court in Bowling v. Brown, “to reimburse [convicted public
officials] for their legal expenses would not encourage the ‘faithful and courageous
discharge of duty on the part of public officials.’ On the contrary, it would encourage
the reverse.”175 No court should give any incentive to an individual “drawn to these
corrupt practices” by promising indemnification.176
VII.

CONCLUSION

While it certainly makes sense to provide for the defense and
indemnification of public employees who are liable for compensatory damages for
liability occasioned by their good faith efforts to discharge their duties, the Tort
Claims Act goes too far when it requires the government to indemnify its employees
for punitive damages stemming from their wholly personal and malicious objectives.
Not only is such indemnification bad policy, it also violates the anti-donation clause
of the New Mexico Constitution. While a litigant will, at some point, bring this issue
to the New Mexico Supreme Court, it is likely that governments will use taxpayers’
money to settle claims to avoid the potential exposure to punitive damages in the
meantime.
The New Mexico Legislature should avoid this needless and illegal
expenditure of money, and save everyone involved the costs of litigating the issue,
by simply amending the TCA to comport with the New Mexico Constitution.

175. Bowling v. Brown, 469 A.2d 896, 901 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (quoting Snowden v. Anne
Arundel Cty., 456 A.2d 380, 384 (Md. 1983)).
176. Wright, 675 N.E.2d at 117.

